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There is an old Irish proverb which states that there are three
things that are important in life: God, human folly, and justice.
The first two are beyond our control, so we must do what we can
with the third.'
I. Introduction
On September 26, 1994, the case that has been heralded as the
trial of the century-People of the State of California v. Simpson-
came to trial.2 On that and the following days, throngs of photogra-
phers, reporters, camerapeople, and interested citizens swarmed the
Criminal Courts Building in Los Angeles, anxious to learn about re-
cent developments in the trial. Even more amazing, perhaps, was the
media circus that occurred within the courtroom itself. Most of the
networks provided live, almost continuous coverage of all phases of
the trial. One reporter described the event as "a thick ghetto of satel-
lite dishes outside the Downtown Criminal Courts Building where the
proceeding was scheduled to begin in two hours, televised live-gavel
to gavel, follicle to follicle-by the big networks and every major Los
Angeles television station but one. Moses parting the Red Sea
wouldn't get this coverage."3 In fact, the hyped-up and often inaccu-
rate media coverage surrounding the Simpson trial was condemned by
Judge Lance Ito on September 23, 1994, when he threatened to ban
television coverage of the trial.4 Perhaps the most amazing aspect of
the Simpson trial was the excessive amount of money spent to investi-
gate and prosecute Orenthal James Simpson. Los Angeles County re-
portedly spent $273,454 investigating the case over a one month
1. COMMISSION ON THE FUTUR.E OF THE CAhIFoRNIA COURTS, JusTIcE IN THE BAL-
ANCE 2020; REPORT OF T-E COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF T=E CALIFORNIA COURTS
137 (1993) (quoting Attorney, Los Angeles Hearing, Aug. 25, 1993). This commission was
created in December 1991, by Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas to anticipate what state the
California courts would be in by the year 2020. 1d. at 2.
2. Jim Newton and Andrea Ford, Murder Trial of Simpson Begins, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
27, 1994, at Al.
3. Howard Rosenberg, TV Carnival Presents Gavel-to-Gave Follicle-to-Follicle Cov-
erage, L.A. Tmms, July 1, 1994, at A7 (home edition).
4. Jim Newton and Andrea Ford, Irate Judge Threatens to Bar TV in Simpson Case,
L.A. TnMms, Sept. 24, 1994, at Al (home edition).
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period.5 In addition, it was speculated that sequestering the jury
would cost approximately $3,446 per day throughout the trial.6 Total
costs for the trial alone were estimated to have reached $1.8 million by
February, 1995.1
Yet, while attention focused on O.J. Simpson's criminal court
proceedings, few realized that what they found so riveting-the Cali-
fornia judicial process-was and continues to be in a state of crisis.
This crisis is due to inadequate funding and resources allocated to the
California trial courts. Furthermore, this crisis threatens to dispropor-
tionately impact the civil justice system due to the constitutional man-
date that criminal trials take precedence over civil trials.8
On July 8, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson signed into law the 1994
Budget Act for the State of California. 9 This Act allocated $638 mil-
lion from the general fund and $173 million from special funds to the
trial courts for fiscal year 1994-95.1° This amount was $37 million less
than that originally allotted for in the 1993-94 budget.11 In addition,
the state contributed only 58% of trial court expenses, 12 despite legis-
lation13 mandating the state to contribute 65% of the state trial court
budget in 1994-95.'4 These numbers, however, are particularly low
when considered with appropriation decreases from previous years.
For example, in 1993-94 the trial court budget for California was
slashed by $79 million.' s Furthermore, in 1993-94 the state contrib-
5. Fox Scrubs Simpson TV Movie: Concern for Fair Trial Prompts Network to Delay
Broadcast, S.J. MERC., Aug. 20, 1994, at A9.
6. William Carlsen, No Gag Order in Simpson Case; Petition Filed to Sequester Jury,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1994, at A3.
7. Vincent J. Schodolski, What Price Simpson Justice?; It's $1.8 Million and Counting,
Cm. TRm., Feb. 19, 1995 at C6.
8. "Criminal cases take priority over civil cases because criminal defendants have a
well-defined constitutional right to speedy trials." Ted Rohrlich, County Bar May Sue
Court Over Delays in Civil Cases, L.A. Tmes, Nov. 14, 1987, § 1 at 1 (home edition), at 1.
The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, cl. 1. There is no similar
provision for civil trials.
9. Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Makes Final Deletions, Then Signs $5Z5-Billion State
Budget, L.A. TimEs, July 9, 1994, at 24 (home edition).
10. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEP'T OF FINANCE, BUDGET FOR THE FIscAL YEAR 1994-
95 FINAL CHANGE BOOK (1994).
11. 1993-94 Budget Cuts Trial Court Funding, COURT NEws, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 3.
12. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANUAL REPORT. JUDICIAL CoUNcIL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGIsLATuRE 6 (1994).
13. The Trial Court Realignment and Efficiency Act of 1991 provides, "Beginning with
the 1994-95 fiscal year, it is the intent of the Legislature to increase trial court funding by
an amount sufficient to fund 65 percent of the annual costs for court operations. It is the
intent of the Legislature that this funding shall increase to 70 percent for the 1995-96 fiscal
year." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 77200 (West Supp. 1994).
14. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 77200 (West Supp. 1994).
15. 1993-94 Budget Cuts Trial Court Funding, COURT NEWS, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 3.
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uted a mere 44% of total state court budget needs-not the 60% re-
quired under California Government Code section 77200.16
Despite unprecedented decreases in state financial support for
the judiciary, case filings have increased. These two factors, more
work and less money, have put unprecedented strain on the judicial
system. For example, superior court filings in California have in-
creased from 738,363 in 1981-8217 to 1,017,798 in 1992-93,18 an in-
crease of 37.85%. Although the raw numbers do not seem surprising
in light of California's population growth rate of 2.4% per year, w
deeper trends forecast the courts' growing inability to cope with the
rise in case filings and case complexity. California, which has the na-
tion's second highest population growth rate,20 is expected to increase
in size to 50 million by the year 2020.21 In contrast, California's popu-
lation today is roughly 32.5 million.22
While California's increasing population puts new pressures on
the legal system, judicial resources are shrinking. During the twelve
year period from 1981-93, the number of judicial seats in California
superior courts grew from 723 to 929, an increase of only 21.4%.23
This number is markedly small when compared to the 26.4% increase
in case filings during the same period.24 Further budget cuts would
merely serve to limit or decrease the number of judicial seats. With-
out adequate funding, the state and counties will be unable to appoint
16. Id.
17. JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, VOLUME II: JUDIcIAL
STATISTICS FOR FIsCAL YEAR 1990-1991 44 (1992).
18. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORmNA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 114.
This rise in case filings is due to filing increases in certain types of dispositions. For exam-
ple, from 1983 to 1993, the number of total civil filings increased from 561,916 to 684,070.
Id. at 119. Interestingly, 1992-93 filings for personal injury, death, property damage, pro-
bate and guardianship, and family law all registered below their corresponding 1983-84
numbers. Id. What accounts for the increase in total civil filings, then, is due largely to the
increase in "other civil petition" filings. Id. These "other civil petitions" include
"[p]etitions for adoption; for change of name; to establish the fact of birth or death (if not
part of a pending probate proceeding); for writs of review, mandate, and prohibition; for
conciliation (when not part of a pending family law proceeding); petitions filed under the
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act; and other special proceedings." Id. at 223.
19. COrMnSSION ON Tim FUTURE OF THE CALIFomNA CoUTrs, supra note 1, at 19.
20. Samuel Krislov & Paul Kramer, 2020 Vision: The Future of the California Civil
Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1915, 1920 (1993).
21. COMMISSION ON THE FUTruRE OF rHm CALIFORNIA COmrs, supra note 1, at 19
(citing CAL. DEP'T OF FINANCE, PROjECTED TOTAL POPULATION OF CALIFORNIA COUN-
TinS: 1990 TO 2040 (1993).
22. Ed Mendel, GOP Candidates Try to Mobilize the Asian-American Community,
SAN DEGo UNoN-TRm., June 20, 1994, at A-3.
23. JUDIcIAL CotNcL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 44;
JuDIcAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1994), supra note 12, at 114.
24. Id.
Table 1
Total Filing and Dispositions in California Superior
Courts Fiscal Years 1983-84 through 1992-93
Thousands Thousands
Source: JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNMIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT. JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT TO THE GOvERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 113 (1994).
enough new and qualified judges to keep pace with the rise in case
filings.
Of course, such budget crises are national in scope and not
unique to California. In 1991, a $77 million cut in the New York state
judicial budget led to a highly publicized battle for funding between
then Chief Judge Sol Wachtler and Governor Mario Cuomo.25 In
Vermont, civil jury trials were suspended during the last five months
of 1990.26 In Minneapolis, civil courts were closed for three months in
25. Edward Frost, Battle of New York "Titans," 76 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 18.
26. Bruce Rutledge, Tight Budgets in a Time of Recession, The Judges' Journal, Sum-
mer 1991, at 18.
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Table 2
Total Filings per Judicial Position and Dispositions
per Judicial Position Equivalent in California
Superior Courts Fiscal Years 1983-84 through 1992-93
200 1,200
Filings per
000- - 1,000
PM00 -- 800
Disposihions per
Judicial Position
Equivalent
60- -600
400- -400
,)n- ?A2n
I I I I I i I I I I83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-19 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Source: JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPOR
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 113 (1994).
JUDICIAL COUNCIL
1989 in order to process back-logged felony cases.2 7 Clearly, inade-
quate court funding is a national concern.
Moreover, the impact of inadequate judicial funding threatens
more than judiciary salaries or court budgets. The current fiscal crisis
literally jeopardizes the existence, welfare, and viability of our judicial
system. Without adequate funding, citizens can expect longer trial de-
lays, poorly maintained court facilities, little or no courtroom security,
limited training for judges, and completely outdated court equip-
27. Richard Chernick, Panel Discussion at the American Judicature Society Midyear
meeting (Mar. 6, 1992), in Funding State and Local Courts: Increasing Demands and De-
creasing Resources, 76 JUDICATURE, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 83.
INADEQUATE TRIAL COURT FUNDING
Table 3
General Civil Filings and Dispositions in California
Superior Courts Fiscal Years 1983-84
through 1992-93
Thousand Thousnds
83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Source: JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT- JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 118 (1994).
ment.28 This Note will assess the budget crisis plaguing the California
state courts and propose constitutional arguments which challenge
current court funding levels. While much of the discussion will focus
on the California courts, arguments and prescriptions can apply in
other states as well.
First, this Note will examine California's trial court funding pro-
cess, analyzing the dual roles of the state and county governments.
Second, this Note will present and assess four constitutional chal-
lenges to inadequate court funding. These constitutional challenges
are based on the Inherent Powers doctrine, the First Amendment's
28. Melvyn Tanenbaum, The State Court Funding Crisis, THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Win-
ter 1993, at 21.
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Table 4
Other Civil Filings and Dispositions* in California
Superior Courts Fiscal Years 1983-84
through 1992-93
I I i I I i I585-SCI 86-87 87-88 88-139 59-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Source: JUDIcIAL CoUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT: JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 118 (1994).
* Other civil filings are civil filings that are not general civil filings. They comprise family
law, probate and guardianship, and civil petitions.
right to petition, the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Finally, the conclu-
sion will describe how the California courts can apply these constitu-
tional challenges to receive sufficient funding.
II. The Trial Court Funding Process in California
A. The California Court Structure
There are four separate levels in the California court system: mu-
nicipal courts, superior courts, appellate courts, and the supreme
court.
Prior to the passage of Proposition 191 in November 1994, the
lowest tier of courts in California were divided into municipal and jus-
tice courts. Municipal courts were established for judicial districts ex-
ceeding 40,000 people and their judges were chosen by the governor.2 9
Justice courts, on the other hand, served populations of 40,000 or
less3" and their judicial officers were appointed by the respective
boards of supervisors.31 Proposition 191 merged the municipal and
justice courts in order to "make better use of judges' time."'
State legislation authorizes county boards of supervisors to divide
each county into judicial districts.33 As of 1992, California had 90 mu-
nicipal courts with 616 judges and 53 justice courts with 53 judges. 4
In 1995, with the implementation of Proposition 191, California will
have 129 municipal courts with 637 judges.35
Municipal courts operate at the local level and have original crim-
inal jurisdiction for misdemeanors and original civil jurisdiction for
claims of $25,000 or less. 36 Municipal courts also maintain small
claims jurisdiction for cases where the amount in controversy is $5000
or less.3 7
The second tier of courts in California, superior courts, are Cali-
fornia's trial courts of general jurisdiction.38 Both probate and juve-
nile courts operate on this tier.39 Superior courts have jurisdiction
over all felony cases, all civil cases with claims exceeding $25,000, and
over all appeals from municipal or small claims court decisions."°
These courts also hear claims requesting specific relief, such as mo-
29. JuDircSAL CouNcm, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 68.
30. David Minier writes, "Justice courts originated in England in the 1300s, when
towns were small and isolated. They were the workhorses of English justice, using non-
lawyer judges to dispense speedy justice in minor cases. The justice court system came to
America with colonization, and soon every small community had its own court." David D.
Minier, Proposition 191 Sweeps Away a Tradition in Rural California Justice, SAC. BnE,
Nov. 3, 1994, at B7.
31. Id.
32. Post-Election: More Order in the Courts, L.A. TrAms, Nov. 30,1994, at 4. "Proposi-
tion 191 purports merely to change the name of justice courts to municipal courts, effective
Jan. 1, 1995. Indeed, as the ballot argument in favor of the proposition correctly points out,
there is currently no significant difference between the rural justice courts and the more
numerous municipal courts. They have the same legal jurisdiction, handle the same kinds
of cases and follow the same procedures." Minier, supra note 30, at B7.
33. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (West 1995).
34. See JuDIcAL COUNCIL, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 154.
35. 190 and 191: 'Yes' on Judicial Reform, L.A. TInMs, Oct. 10, 1994, at B6.
36. JuDICIAL. CouNcm OF CALiFORNA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 68.
37. Id.
38. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10 (West 1995).
39. JumicLA CouNcIL OF CALIFoRNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 104.
40. Id,
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tions for declaratory judgments and injunctions.41 There are 58 supe-
rior courts (one for each county), employing approximately 789 judges
statewide.42 In fact, there are more than 200 superior court judges
sitting in Los Angeles county alone.43
The third tier of the California judicial system consists of the
courts of appeal, California's primary courts of appellate review.44
These courts typically sit in three-judge panels, hearing appeals from
the superior courts, and habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and pro-
hibition proceedings.45 California has six appellate districts with 88
justices in all.46
Finally, the highest tier in California's judicial structure and the
state's highest court is the California Supreme Court. The supreme
court is made up of the Chief Justice and six associate justices.47 This
court has the discretion to review appellate court decisions and must
review all death penalty appeals.48 In addition, the supreme court has
original jurisdiction to hear mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and
habeas corpus proceedings.49
B. History of Trial Court Funding in California
Courts at different tiers are supported by different funding mech-
anisms. The state of California completely funds the state supreme
court and the courts of appeal.'0 In contrast, the trial courts (the mu-
nicipal and superior courts) are only partially funded by the state.
The counties must provide the remainder of the money needed to op-
erate these trial courts.5'
Prior to 1985, trial courts were funded primarily by the counties.52
The Trial Court Funding Act of 1985 (Assembly Bill No. 19),91 the
first legislation enacted to reform trial court funding in forty years,
provided that the state would supply bloc grants to the counties ac-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. While the number of judicial seats seems exceedingly high, the true measure of
adequate judicial resources, however, depends on the ratio of judges to case filings. For
example, from 1983 to 1992, the number of case filings per judicial seat increased from
1,044 to 1,134 - an increase of 8.6%. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT, VoLumE II: JUDICIAL STATSTcs FOR FIsCAL YEAR 1991-1992 44 (1993).
44. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 16.
45. 1d.
46. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 86.
47. Id. at 4.
48. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
49. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
50. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 77200 (West Supp. 1994). See also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77200 (West Supp. 1994).
52. State Funding for Trial Courts: A Brief History, COURT NEws, Feb.-Mar. 1993, at 5.
53. A.B.19 (enacted as CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77200).
cording to the number of authorized judicial positions in each
county.54 Under the 1985 Act, counties retained control of grant allo-
cation within the various judicial departments. 51 Ironically, no money
was ever appropriated to implement the law, and the structure of trial
court funding remained as it had been prior to the 1985 legislation.56
In other words, from 1985 to 1988 no comprehensive trial court fund-
ing reform was implemented.
In 1988, the Brown-Presley Trial Court Funding Act was enacted,
superseding the 1985 legislation by similarly providing for state finan-
cial support of trial courts.5 7 The Brown-Presley Act, by appropriat-
ing bloc grants to each county, absorbed part of total trial court
costs.5 8 This Act is still in force today in an amended version.5 9
Under the 1988 Act, the state was to fund 50% of court operation
costs starting in 1988-89; the state's share was to increase by 5% in the
1989-90 budget.60 In 1989-90, the first year the Brown-Presley Act
was implemented, the state contributed only $537 million, or 44% of
total trial court costs. 61 The next year the state, due to internal fiscal
problems, allocated even less-a mere $398.2 million, or 37.6% of trial
court needs.62 Clearly, actual grants did not match those required by
the legislature.
In response to this dramatic decrease in court funding, California
State Senator Phil Isenberg introduced what was to become the Trial
Court Realignment and Efficiency Act of 1991. ("The Realignment
Act").63 The Realignment Act called for the state to increase its con-
tribution to trial court funding by 5% each year until it reached 70%
in 1995-96.64 Despite this noble effort to increase funding for the trial
courts, the state is still far short of its 70% goal. The 1993-94 budget
allocated only $673 million, a 44% contribution, to the state trial
courts.
65
Included in the Realignment Act is a provision which creates the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id; see CA. GOV'T CODE §§ 77000-77400 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
58. Id.
59. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77200 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
60. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 77200 (West 1988).
61. State Funding for Trial Courts: A Brief History, supra note 52, at 5.
62. Id.
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77200(a) (West 1995) (enacted). See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT VOLUME I: JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 10 (1993).
64. Id.
65. 1993-1994 Budget Cuts Trial Court Funding, COURT NEws, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 3.
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Trial Court Trust Fund.66 This fund is actually a state-wide collection
of civil filing and court reporter fees.67 The revenue generated by col-
lecting these fees is intended to partially offset the state's greater bur-
den of trial court funding.68 This fund, however, has fallen far short of
expectations. For fiscal year 1992-93, the fund was expected to amass
some $140 million.69 The Daily Journal, however, reported that as of
April 29, 1993, with just two months left to collect fees for that year,
the fund had raised only $60 million.70
Currently, trial court funding is appropriated according to the
Brown-Presley and the Realignment Acts. Under these measures, the
state apportions part of its general fund towards the trial courts and
administers the Trial Court Trust Fund. The state legislature has au-
thorized an increase in state contributions until the state's share
reaches 70% of budget needs.71 Unfortunately, these lofty goals are
unrealistic. Legislators appropriating future funds have miscalculated
the recession's drastic impact on the California treasury.72 For exam-
ple, in 1991-92, the legislature made appropriations based on an ex-
pected $300 million increase in the general fund.73 That year,
however, the general fund suffered a net loss of $57 million.7 4 The
state-wide recession resulted in less tax revenue for the state and, con-
sequently, less money for the courts from the general fund.75 As the
state finds itself with fewer and fewer resources to dole out among
competing government agencies, the burden of funding the trial courts
has fallen largely on California's counties.
C. The County's Role in Trial Court Funding
With few state monies allocated to fund state trial courts, counties
must provide the bulk of the money to operate the courts.76 The
counties, however, are severely limited by the ways they can raise rev-
enue. Three factors prevent the counties from effectively raising reve-
nue to fund the trial courts: Proposition Thirteen, the unattractiveness
of user fees, and the organizational structure of the counties. In 1977,
66. $140 Million in Trust Fund Monies Expected for Courts, COURT NEws, Apr.-May
1993, at 1.
67. Tom Dresslar, Assembly Panel Cuts $90 Million in Court Funds, L.A. DAmY J.,
Apr. 29, 1993, at 8.
68. State Funding for Trial Courts: A Brief History, supra note 52, at 5.
69. Id.
70. Dresslar, supra note 67, at 8.
71. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77200(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
72. Dresslar, supra note 67, at 8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Don J. De Benedictis, Budget Ax Hits Justice, 77 A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 16.
76. Carl Baar, SEPARATE BuT SuBSERViENT: COURT BUDGETNG IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 5 (1975).
California voters approved Proposition Thirteen.77 This measure pro-
vided for real property to be taxed according to its purchase value.7
In order to prevent the counties from subverting the goal of Proposi-
tion Thirteen to freeze property tax rates, the constitutional amend-
ment also limited the counties' ability to levy sales and other local
taxes.79 Under Proposition Thirteen, counties may not increase sales
or other taxes without the approval of two-thirds of the voters.8 0 The
likelihood that a tax hike will pass with a 66% vote is extremely re-
mote considering the current public disfavor for higher taxes.8'
Proposition Thirteen does not inhibit the counties' ability to raise
direct user fees for county services.", However, the ethics, constitu-
tionality, and practicality of substantially raising court fees has been
called into question by a number of authorities. Chief Justice Mal-
cohn Lucas of the California Supreme Court addressed the problem
as follows:
[I ncreased user fees, such as penalty assessments or higher fil-
ing fees, [are not] the solution. As regressive sources of reve-
nue, they too often unfairly place the burden for sustaining
courts without regard to ability to pay or consideration for the
overall benefit we each derive from their service. In speaking of
funding for the courts, we cannot focus on a fiscal budget sheet's
bottom line because the real bottom line cannot be measured in
dollars and cents. 83
Given these circumstances, counties have few, if any, acceptable
means of independently raising revenue to adequately fund trial
courts.
Furthermore, inadequate consideration of trial court needs often
attends the disbursement of county funds. Budgetary authority at the
county level is vested in various county boards of supervisors. These
boards have discretionary power to allocate money and must choose
to appropriate funds among competing public entities, including hos-
77. Proposition Thirteen is now codified as CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
78. CAL. CONST. art XIIIA, § 2.
79. Id. at § 4.
80. Id. See also Joanna M. Miller, Counties Brace for Cuts in Police, Other Services,
L.A. Trams, Aug. 30, 1992, at 3.
81. Public opposition to higher taxes may be demonstrated by the Clinton Administra-
tion's recent announcement of a "middle class tax cut." Leo Rennert, Clinton Proposes
$60 Billion Tax Cut, SAC. BEE, Dec. 16, 1994, at Al. Many have speculated that this an-
nouncement was fueled, in large part, by President Clinton's attempts to gain popularity
with the electorate. See id; Clinton Likely to Propose Tax Cut for Middle Class, S.F. EXAM.
neR, Dec. 13, 1994, at A15; Michael Wines, The Nation; The Talk is Tax Cuts: Look Who's
Talking Too, N.Y. TuMas, Dec. 18, 1994, § 4, at 4.
82. 1d.
83. Hon. Malcolm M. Lucas, Is Inadequate Funding Threatening Our System of Jus-
tice?, JuiDicATumE, Apr.-May 1991, 292, 293.
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pitals, museums, libraries, parks, and social services.84  Once a final
budget is approved and money is appropriated, it is extremely difficult
to challenge the board of supervisors for increased funding.
Under the procedures outlined in the Budget and Tax Levy Act, 5
boards of supervisors have final discretion to determine what amounts
will be appropriated for various departments.8 6 After a final budget
has been adopted by a board, appropriations cannot be modified un-
less the budget itself is revised, cancelled, or funds are transferred
from another department. 87 In addition, the budget can only be mod-
ified to deal with emergencies, to follow court orders, or as otherwise
specifically provided by law.88
Courts, however, have interpreted the seemingly stringent lan-
guage of the Budget and Tax Levy Act to allow modification of budg-
ets after adoption by boards of supervisors. In Niceley v. County of
Madera,8 9 a sheriff incurred separate expenses by employing detec-
tives to track down cattle thieves and investigate a murder. These ex-
penses were in excess of the amount allotted to his office by the
county budget for the fiscal year.90 A claim for the items in excess of
the budget was filed with the Madera County Board of Supervisors.
The board of supervisors refused to pay for the expenses, finding them
unnecessary and noting that the sheriff had already exhausted the al-
located funds. 91 The trial court found the expenses proper and neces-
sary, holding that the expenses constituted a legal charge against the
County of Madera. The sheriff was awarded judgment against the
county in the full amount of the claim.92 The appellate court affirmed
the ruling, stating:
[i]t is important to observe that subdivision 5 of section 3714
now Government Code section 29122] ... does not make final
the budget as adopted by the board of supervisors, nor does it
make final the sum or allowance made or allotted to any partic-
ular official. The question is left open for a determination by
the court as to whether any other items of expenditure shall be
determined to be a claim against the county, and whether the
county shall be held liable therefor. This plainly appears from
the words specifying that no payment shall be made "except
upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction." And this
84. Carla Rivera, County Charts Risky Course With Budget, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1993,
at 1.
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29120 (West 1994).
86. Rivera, supra note 84, at 1.
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29120 (West 1994).
88. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 29122 (West 1994).
89. 111 Cal. App. 731 (1931).
90. Id at 733.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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provision follows that portion of the section relating to expendi-
tures outside of, and in excess of, the budget allowance.9
Accordingly, expenditures in excess of budget appropriations can
be authorized by a court or by the board of supervisors in case of
emergency or where required by law.94 In addition, county boards of
supervisors cannot be relieved of mandatory duties by failing or refus-
ing to appropriate adequate funds to meet the expenses necessary to
carry out such duties.95 Nevertheless, county officials, including
elected officers, cannot completely ignore the final budget as adopted
by the respective board of supervisors. In Taliaferro v. Locke96 the
court observed:
As concerns the enforcement of the criminal law the office of
the district attorney is charged with grave responsibilities to the
public. These responsibilities demand integrity, zeal and consci-
entious efforts in the administration of justice under the criminal
law. However, both as to the investigation and prosecution that
effort is subject to the budgetary control of boards of supervi-
sors or other legislative bodies controllinp the number of depu-
ties, investigators and other employees.
A county officer has the responsibility to stay within the amount
appropriated by the board of supervisors. Specifically, these responsi-
bilities include the efficient completion of official duties within the
amounts budgeted. 98 Emergency appropriations for overtime pay,
however, are not sanctioned if the county officer failed "to properly
organize the work of the department," undertook to perform activities
outside his or her official duties, or extravagantly performed such du-
ties.99 Furthermore, "under the guise of emergencies, the [county of-
ficer] may not make a practice of requiring overtime work of his [or
her] staff where no emergency exists and extraordinary services are
not required for the immediate preservation of public order ....
Such practice does not come within the emergency exception nor is it
the payment of mandatory expenditures required by law."100
A county officer is thus normally required to carry out his or her
duties within the amounts appropriated by the board of supervisors.
A county officer does not have "unlimited license" in the expenditure
of county funds.10 ' State law, however, does permit the expenditure
93. Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
94. Accord 15 Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 259, 263 (1950).
95. See, eg., Ross v. Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1977); County of Los Angeles
v. Payne, 66 P.2d 658 (Cal. 1937).
96. 182 Cal. App. 2d 752 (1960).
97. Id at 755-56.
98. 39 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 318, 321-22 (1962).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Niceley v. County of Madera, 296 P. 306, 310 (Cal. 1931).
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of amounts in excess of budgeted appropriations under extraordinary,
unusual, or unanticipated circumstances.'0 2
In the event that a claim is made in excess of budgetary appropri-
ations, the board of supervisors must review the claim to determine
whether the expense is a necessary and valid county charge.10 3 If the
board rejects the claim, the courts are the final arbiter of both the
expenditure's necessity and the legality of the charge against the
county.10
4
Boards of supervisors have broad powers to oversee the opera-
tions of all county officers, agencies, departments, and employees. 0 5
In addition, boards have general supervisory control of all county fi-
nancial affairs." The boards' budgetary authority, however, does not
grant the boards autonomous authority to control or limit discretion
vested in county officers. For instance, a county officer need not first
consult with the board of supervisors before incurring an expense that
the officer deems proper in the discharge of statutory duties. 0 7 Such
limits on the power of boards of supervisors have been confirmed in a
number of cases.
In Hicks v. Board of Supervisors,'08 the court limited the board's
authority to reallocate budgetary resources. 0 9 In Hicks, the Los An-
geles Board of Supervisors attempted to transfer investigators from
the district attorney's office to the sheriff's office." 0 The court con-
cluded that the transfer was not a budgetary action and that the law
did not enable the board to transfer one officer's statutory function to
another officer."'
Furthermore, in Brandt v. Board of Supervisors,112 the court con-
cluded that the board of supervisors lacked the authority to use its
budgetary power to control government employees, particularly sher-
iffs. In Brandt, the petitioner challenged the living conditions at the
county jail."13 The court held that the board of supervisors was im-
properly named as a defendant. Specifically, the court found that
there was no evidence presented that the board had failed to provide
the sheriff with sufficient funds to perform his statutory duty of oper-
102. Id at 309. Under certain circumstances, county officers may even be required to
spend in excess of appropriations granted.
103. County of Yolo v. Joyce, 105 P. 125, 126-27 (Cal. 1909).
104. Cunning v. County of Humboldt, 266 P. 522, 523 (Cal. 1928); Niceley, 296 P. at 308.
105. Niceley, 296 P. at 309.
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29001; see also White v. Mathews, 156 P. 372,374 (Cal. 1916).
107. Thiel Detective Co. v. County of Tuolumne, 173 P. 1120, 1122 (Cal. 1918).
108. 69 Cal. App. 3d 228 (1977).
109. Id. at 244.
110. Id at 232.
111. Id at 240.
112. 84 Cal. App. 3d 598 (1978).
113. Id. at 602.
ating the jail.114 The court stated that "the board not only had no
duty but also had no right.., to control employment in or operation
of the sheriff's office." 115
In sum, boards of supervisors may determine amounts to be ap-
propriated to county entities. These boards, however, may not dictate
how those funds are used to carry out state-mandated duties. To the
extent boards fail to appropriate sufficient funds for their county of-
ficers to carry out mandated duties, a court may order that funds be
provided.
Where judges are viewed as "state officers," funding challenges
must be brought directly against the state. If, on the other hand,
judges and other court personnel are regarded as "county officers,"
with relationships similar to those between sheriffs and boards of su-
116outpervisors, courts may incur expenses against the counties which are
necessary to fulfill state-mandated duties.
Article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution provides:
"[t]he judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court,
courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice
courts.' 1 17 Despite this extremely broad directive, case law has estab-
lished limits on the power granted to California's judicial branch. For
example, in the early decision of People v. Bird,18 the California
Supreme Court defined judicial power as the "power to adjudicate
upon the legal rights of persons or property." 119 Such power, how-
ever, is limited by duties delegated to other branches of government.
The judiciary may not usurp executive or legislative exercises of
power: a judicial act "determines what the law is, [and] what the
rights of parties are with reference to transactions already had;
[whereas, a legislative act] prescribes what the law shall be in future
cases arising under it."1 20 Similarly, the judicial branch is limited
through its exercise of jurisdiction. The California courts may not
hear cases subject to federal or other states' jurisdiction.
Therefore, the California trial courts may act independently of
the boards of supervisors to fulfill state-mandated duties. While the
boards do have the power to define and set county budgets, their
114. Id.
115. Id
116. People v. Otto, 18 P. 869, 870 (Cal. 1888). See also County of Placer v. Freeman,
87 P. 628, 630 (Cal. 1906); Crowley v. Freud, 64 P. 696, 698 (Cal. 1901) (Van Dyke, J.,
dissenting). But cf. County of Sonoma v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 222 Cal.
App. 3d 1133, 1145 (1990) (holding that judges are state employees for purposes of work-
ers' compensation).
117. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §1.
118. 300 P. 23 (Cal. 1931).
119. I& at 26.
120. Nider v. Homan, 89 P. 2d 136, 139 (Cal. 1939) (quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99
U.S. 708, 761 (1878)).
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power may not be used to limit the fulfillment of mandated judicial
functions. In other words, where the county has appropriated insuffi-
cient funds for the courts to operate in their official capacities, county
boards of supervisors may be compelled to release monies to the judi-
ciary. The next section will explore the precise constitutional chal-
lenges that may be forwarded to compel county and state
governments to adequately provide for the trial courts.
II. Arguments to Compel Court Funding
Faced with scarce resources, state trial courts have few ways to
cope with inadequate court funding. For example, prior to the enact-
ment of the 1993-94 budget, the Los Angeles courts reduced their ex-
penditures by $15 million by imposing hiring freezes and offering early
retirement plans.121 These measures reduced the superior court work
force by 17% and the municipal court work force by 15%.'2 Despite
these efforts to efficiently and effectively administer the courts, trial
court budgets were even further decreased. For example, trial court
funding in Los Angeles was reduced by $58 million for 1993-94.'23 In
order to comply with this budget, it was estimated that the Los Ange-
les superior court would be forced to lay off 55% of its employees. 24
According to Los Angeles Superior Court Presiding Judge Robert M.
Mallano, such drastic cuts would give priority to criminal cases over
civil cases on the courts' dockets due to the Sixth Amendment's right
to a speedy trial.'1 Funding and personnel cuts would deprioritize
and create delays for the trial of any civil matters. In June 1993, Judge
Mallano warned:
The consequences of these reductions would be severe. The
protection of the courts would be unavailable to those who need
it most, such as battered women and children, who are the sub-ject of custody disputes. Injured persons seeking recompense,
consumers seeking their rights, businesses seeking to enforce
contracts for payment of goods, and landlords seeking to collect
rents would be turned away. The Courts in California provide a
constitutionally established process for protection [ofiour citi-
zens by resolving civil disputes. This process is at the core of a
civilized society. Without access to the courts, one's legal rights
exist only on paper.' 26
121. Robert M. Mallano & Aviva K. Bobb, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
1993, at B6 (home edition).
122. ld.
123. 1d.
124. Lauren Blau, Superior Court Facing Major Personnel Cuts, L.A. DAM.Y JouRNAL,
May 4, 1993, at 1.
125. Mallano & Bobb, supra note 121, at B6.
126. Id.
In order for the California courts to address the problem of inad-
equate funding, it is helpful to look at how other jurisdictions have
handled similar crises. Since 1985, courts throughout the country have
brought claims challenging inadequate funding. 27 Traditionally, such
claims have rested on the basic premise that the judicial system has
the inherent power to compel funding in order to maintain its own
integrity. 128 Three additional arguments, however, may be advanced
to secure adequate trial court funding. These arguments include: (1)
the First Amendment's right to petition; (2) the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to a jury trial; and (3) the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. The following section outlines and evalu-
ates these arguments.
A. The Inherent Powers Doctrine
Around the turn of the century, the inherent powers doctrine was
developed and applied by the judiciary to compel adequate court
funding. 2 This doctrine is essentially an extension of the separation
of powers theory embedded throughout the first three articles of the
United States Constitution.130 According to the noted constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe, the framers of the Constitution separated
governmental power into three separate branches so that no single
branch might divest other branches of power.' 3 ' In order for this sys-
tem of checks and balances to function properly, each branch must be
independent of the others: "A breakdown of such independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interested assertions of another."' 32
The inherent powers doctrine stresses that the judicial system, as
one of the branches of government, must claim and exert certain pow-
ers to maintain the integrity of the judicial branch. Such powers in-
clude those that ensure the continuity and viability of the judicial
system.
1. Cases Implicating the Inherent Powers Doctrine
Many states recognize that courts have the inherent authority to
order payment of expenses that are reasonably necessary for the ad-
127. De Benedictis, supra note 75, at 18.
128. See e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A2d 193 (Pa. 1971), cert de-
nied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass.
1972).
129. See State ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902); Millholen v. Riley, 293
P. 69 (Cal. 1930).
130. Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Ju-
dicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REv. 217, 224 (1993).
131. LAURENCE H. TRnE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW 15-16 (1978).
132. Jackson, supra note 130, at 224.
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ministration of justice.' 33 These jurisdictions, however, have devel-
oped different interpretations about the breadth of the doctrine.
Jurisdictions that have applied the inherent powers doctrine can be
divided into three groups.' 34 First, a number of states have adopted
the broad view that a court's inherent power extends to incurring and
ordering payment of all debts necessary to administer the duties of a
court. 35 Under this view, the judicial branch is seen as having a con-
stitutional mandate to maintain its independence and fulfill its duties.
Therefore, the courts' inherent powers are constitutional in nature
and may not be limited by legislation. Second, a number of jurisdic-
tions, including California, have restricted the breadth of the inherent
powers doctrine, holding in "less sweeping language" that the judici-
ary can only compel funding necessary for the performance of judicial
duties. 36 Under this interpretation, funding can be compelled "to re-
move obstructions to [the courts'] successful and convenient opera-
tion, to secure the free and untrammeled exercise of their functions,
or to properly perform their business.' 37 The legislature, however,
may limit the courts' ability to compel funding under this view.' 38 Fi-
nally, other courts have taken a more limited approach to the inherent
powers doctrine and applied it only to specific expenses, without indi-
cating whether the doctrine might have greater application. 39
The broad doctrinal view that trial courts can order payment of
all expenses necessary for the administration of justice has been
adopted in eleven jurisdictions. 140 For example, in Carlson v. State,
14 1
the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a trial court could compel a
city council to fund the salaries of court employees.'4 In Carlson, a
municipal court judge calculated the court's budget for 1965 and sub-
133. Fifteen states, including California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Washington have all ruled on the application of the inherent powers doctrine. Gary D.
Spivey, Annotation, Inherent Power of Court to Compel Appropriation or Expenditure of
Funds for Judicial Purposes, 59 A.L.R. 3d 569 (1974 & Supp. 1994).
134. Id. at 574-75.
135. Id. at 574.
136. Id at 574-75.
137. Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
138. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
139. Spivey, supra note 133, at 575.
140. These include Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Penn-
sylvania, Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, and Washington. Id. at 581-84.
141. 220 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. 1966). The Indiana system of determining the courts' budget
is similar to that of California. In California, the courts compile their budgets and submit
them to the Board of Supervisors and the state legislature for approval. The Carlson case
demonstrates how the municipal courts in Indiana similarly compute their budgets and
submit them to the city councils for approval.
142. Id at 536.
mitted it to the city council for approval. 43 The council reduced the
amount requested from $71,042.50 to $53,247.50.144 In doing so, the
council cut the salaries of a referee, a bailiff, and a probation of-
ficer.145 The supreme court found that the city council's actions vio-
lated the court's authority to expend money necessary for the proper
functioning of the court.46 The court also rejected the argument
that such a broad and judicially deferential interpretation of the inher-
ent powers doctrine would lead courts to spend extravagant amounts
on unnecessary expenses. 147 The court first reasoned that the judici-
ary was in the best position to understand what expenses would be
truly necessary, and second, that if extravagant expenditures did oc-
cur, the judiciary would be subject to voter approval in the form of
elections.148
The inherent powers doctrine was similarly interpreted in the
Pennsylvania decision of Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate.149 On
December 3, 1969, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas submit-
ted its proposed operating budget of $19,706,278 to the city's finance
director.15 This proposed budget was reduced by the finance director
to $16,488,263 and subsequently approved by the mayor.15 1 The
Court of Common Pleas then asked for additional funding of
$5,230,817-a full $2,012,801 more than originally requested.15 2 The
city council denied the request and appropriated $16,488,263 to the
courts-the amount that the finance director and the mayor had origi-
nally approved.5 3 Presiding Judge Vincent A. Carroll brought a
mandamus proceeding on behalf of the judges of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in Philadelphia to compel the mayor and city council to
appropriate the additional funds to the courts.'5 4 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the judiciary could order the executive and
legislative branches to provide reasonably necessary funds even
though such funds had previously been denied.5 5 Relying on the in-
herent powers doctrine, the court reasoned that the judiciary must
have the ability to compel payment of sums reasonably necessary to
carry out mandated duties and to protect the "efficient administration
143. Id. at 533.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 536.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
150. Id. at 194-95.
151. Id. at 195.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id at 194.
155. Id. at 199.
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of justice" against impairment by the executive and legislative
branches.'56 "Efficient administration of justice," as defined by the
court, meant the "proper functioning or adequate administration" of
the court system. 157 While the decision did not define in great detail
what expenses might be considered "reasonably necessary," it did in-
dicate that funding to ensure adequate personnel, competitive sala-
ries, necessary administration services, and maintenance of court
facilities would probably be included within this definition. 58 In sup-
port of the broad reading of the inherent powers doctrine, the court
cited the increased demands upon the judicial system and specifically,
the increase in the number of civil and criminal trials. 5 9 At the same
time though, the court indicated unwillingness to consider burdens,
such as the city's financial difficulties, in determining the reasonable-
ness of the appropriations: "[T]he deplorable financial conditions in
Philadelphia must yield to the Constitutional mandate that the Judici-
ary shall be free and independent and able to provide an efficient and
effective system of Justice.' 160
Massachusetts also endorsed a broad application of the inherent
powers theory. In O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worchester'6' the
Supreme Judicial Court declared that the state judiciary may incur all
debts reasonably necessary for its operation. 62 The court further held
that ex parte orders may be issued to compel payment by the county
of such debts.' 63 In O'Coin's, a superior court judge purchased a tape
recorder and three tapes to use in criminal trials.'6 The judge then
forwarded the invoice for $86.00 to the county treasurer for payment,
along with a letter indicating that the tape recorder was a "necessary"
expenditure to ensure that the court would sit even when the stenog-
156. lId at 197.
157. ld. at 199.
158. ld. Although concurring in the result, Justice Jones disagreed that "reasonably
necessary" was the proper gauge to determine whether a court could compel funding. Spe-
cifically, he stated that a city's financial resources should be taken into account when de-
ciding whether a court can order payment of expenses:
[T]he majority essentially holds that whatever amount is "reasonably necessary"
for judicial administration must be awarded even though the City may have no
available funds. With this proposition I cannot agree; in my opinion, the compu-
tation of a "reasonably necessary" amount must consider the financial resources
available to the city.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (Jones, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 199.
160. Id
161. 287 N.E.2d 608, 612 (Mass. 1972); See also County of Barnstable v. Common-
wealth, 572 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1991).
162. O'Coin's, 287 N.E.2d at 612.
163. Id. at 611.
164. lI- at 610.
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rapher is unavailable. 65 The treasurer refused to pay for the tape re-
corder arguing that no statutory scheme delegated authority to the
judiciary to make such purchases. 66 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts ordered the treasurer to pay for the recorder, explain-
ing that each judge possessed inherent powers to protect the courts
from "impairments," such as inadequate facilities, supplies or person-
nel.'67 To prevent such "impairment," the judiciary is authorized to
incur expenses and order government officials to make payment, even
in the absence of an applicable statute. 68 As the court noted, how-
ever, the inherent power of the judiciary is not without limits. 169 For
example, the judiciary must exercise self-restraint and "proceed cau-
tiously.., whenever exercise of an inherent judicial power would
bring [it] near the sphere of another department."' 70
A second, more restrained approach to the inherent powers doc-
trine maintains that the judiciary does have inherent power to compel
the appropriation of funds so long as the funding is necessary for the
performance of judicial duties.'71 Such necessary expenses under this
approach have included court employee salaries and jury costs. 72
California adopted this slightly more restrictive interpretation in the
1930s.173
California first addressed the issue in 1930 in Millholen v.
Riley, 74 where the state treasurer refused to pay the salary of a legal
secretary. 75 The Court of Appeal for the Second District appointed
Millholen as a legal secretary and fixed her compensation at $225 per
month.' 76 Even though funds had been appropriated by the legisla-
ture for the court, the department of finance refused to pay Mil-
lholen's salary. The California Supreme Court concluded that a
"court set up by the Constitution has within it the power of self-pres-
ervation... to remove all obstructions to its successful and convenient
operation.' 77 The court, however, recognized that there are limita-
tions on the inherent powers of the judiciary. For example, the legis-
lature can regulate or put "reasonable restrictions" on the courts as
165. Id.
166. Id. at 610-11.
167. Id. at 612.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 615.
170. Id.
171. Spivey, supra note 133, at 174-75.
172. Id. at 584-85.
173. Id. at 584.
174. 293 P. 69, 69-70 (Cal. 1930).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 70.
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long as the court's essential functions are not impaired.178 This early
case indicated California's acceptance of the inherent powers doc-
trine. The Millholen decision, however, signified that California
would not recognize the inherent powers doctrine in its unadulterated
form. Accordingly, reasonable legislative restrictions may exist to
preclude a court from exercising complete inherent authority over ap-
propriations. Therefore, unlike the broad interpretation of the inher-
ent powers doctrine, the courts may only compel reasonably necessary
expenses if the legislature has not prohibited them.
Rappaport v. Payne,179 a later California appellate decision, relied
on Millholen. In this case, Samuel Rappaport worked for two days in
December, 1932 as a temporary court reporter for the Los Angeles
Superior Court.180 The superior court certified that the services were
"just and legal" and ordered the county auditor to pay Rappaport
$30.00.181 The auditor refused the request. 8 In ruling that the supe-
rior court was empowered to order the county to pay for a pro
tempore court reporter, 83 the California Supreme Court held that the
judiciary's inherent power of self-preservation included the ability to
demand funds essential to its proper operation. 84 Again, the court
noted that such discretion can be limited by legislative regulation, pro-
vided that judicial efficiency is not hampered.185
Finally, certain jurisdictions have adopted a third approach to in-
herent powers cases. 86 These jurisdictions recognize that the judici-
ary can compel payment for specific judicial expenses only if they are
allowed by statute or case law. If particular court expenses have not
been approved by statute or case law, those expenses will need to be
tested through litigation. For example, certain states have only ruled
on the application of the inherent powers doctrine in such areas as
compensation of court employees,' the costs of upkeep for court-
178. Id. at 71.
179. 35 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1934).
180. Id. at 183.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 184.
184. Id.
185. Id
186. Such jurisdictions include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Spivey, supra note 133, at §§ 7-15.
187. See generally Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 1947); McAfee v.
State, 284 N.E2d 778 (Ind. 1972); Seventeenth Dist. Probate Court v. Gladwin County Bd.
of Comm'rs, 401 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1986); State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 89 N.W. 175
(Minn. 1902); State ex reL Anderson v. St. Louis County, 421 S.W2d 249 (Mo. 1967); State
ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970); Board of Comm'rs v.
Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court, 597 P.2d 728 (Mont. 1979); Azbarea v. North Las Vegas, 590
P.2d 161 (Nev. 1979); State ex reL Lorig v. Board of Comm'rs, 369 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio
houses,18 8 publication costs, 8 9 costs associated with transcribing testi-
mony,19° jury-related expenses, 91 and prosecutorial/criminal defense
costs.
92
2. Limitations on the Inherent Powers Doctrine
Many jurisdictions that have adopted the inherent powers doc-
trine have limited the courts' implied powers. For instance, certain
jurisdictions permit courts to exercise their inherent power only in the
absence of statutory authority. 93 Some jurisdictions require that
courts first exhaust alternative means of funding before resorting to
implied powers.
In State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan,'94 the Montana Supreme Court
held that the judiciary lacked the authority to order the payment of a
court employee's salary where this authority was vested by statute in
the county sheriff.1 95 Similarly, in Board of County Commissioners v.
Devine,196 the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a judge could not
appoint more bailiffs per court than provided by statute.197 Even Cal-
ifornia has recognized that statutory limitations may curtail a court's
inherent power. In Millholen v. Riley, 98 the court noted that the state
legislature had the authority to limit inherent functions of the court by
statute: "[T]he Legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon con-
stitutional functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or ma-
terially impair the exercise of those functions."'199
The inherent powers doctrine has also been limited to situations
in which statutory methods to compel funding have first been ex-
plored. For example, Devine sketched out the procedure necessary to
invoke the inherent powers doctrine in Nevada:
1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1972); Commonwealth v.
Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 1940).
188. See generally Gary City Court v. Gary, 489 N.W.2d 511 (ind. 1986); Board of
Comm'rs v. Gwin, 36 N.E. 237 (Ind. 1894); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68 P. 689 (Nev.
1902); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E2d 125 (N.C. 1991); Committee for
Marion County Bar Ass'n v. County of Marion, 123 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1954); State e rel
Finley v. Pfeiffer, 126 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio 1955).
189. See generally State ex rel. Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Flynn, 69 N.E. 159 (Ind.
1902); Scott v. Minnehaha County, 152 N.W. 699 (S.D. 1915).
190. See generally Gallagher v. Boyle, 209 P. 80 (Cal. 1922); Moynahan v. New York, 98
N.E. 482 (N.Y. 1912).
191. See generally Stowell v. Jackson County Supervisors, 23 N.W. 5757 (Mich. 1885).
192. See generally Spivey, supra note 133, at §§ 13-14.
193. See Spivey, supra note 133, at 586.
194. 137 P. 392 (Mont. 1913).
195. Ied at 395-96.
196. 294 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1956).
197. Id. at 368.
198. 293 P. 69 (Cal. 1930).
199. Id. at 71 (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar, 281 P. 1018 (Cal. 1929)).
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[T]he power of a court or judge to secure an attendant for his
court, at public expense, could properly be exercised only where
the regular, orderly statutory methods had failed, or where the
officials charged by the legislature to provide the necessary at-
tendant had arbitrarily or capriciously failed to do so, or where
an emergency otherwise existed.200
Courts in California may rely on the inherent powers doctrine to
challenge budget cuts. Although California's interpretation of this
doctrine is not as broad as that of other jurisdictions, California case
law has established that state legislative actions which impair essential
judicial functions violate the separation of powers guaranteed under
the federal and state constitutions. If under-financed state courts re-
sort to using the inherent powers doctrine, the state legislature may
attempt to enact legislation which directly limits, but does not impair
the essential functions of the courts. Millholen affirmed that the Cali-
fornia legislature may properly limit the use of the inherent powers
doctrine by statute so long as the courts can still perform their integral
functions. Nonetheless, the California legislature has never attempted
to place direct limits on judicial power.20 ' Furthermore, case law has
not determined if county or local governmental bodies similarly pos-
sess the state authority to limit by legislation the inherent powers of
the judiciary.
B. The First Amendment Right to Petition
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances. '20 2  The parallel provision of the California
Constitution states, "The people have the right to instruct their repre-
sentatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assem-
ble freely to consult for the common good. '20 3
Federal and state courts have a long history of interpreting the
First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, press, and assembly.
Despite judicial focus on the First Amendment, the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances has historically been ig-
nored.2° In fact, only within the past twenty years have courts even
begun to explore the constitutional implications of the right to
200. Devine, 294 P.2d at 367.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 174-192.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
203. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
204. Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Re-
dress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 15, 16 (1993).
petition.2 °s
1. History of the Right to Petition
In June of 1789, James Madison presented his pro osed constitu-
tional amendments to the House of Representatives. 2 6
The proposed amendments separated the right to assemble and
petition from the rights to speech, press and religion.2' 7 On July 28,
1789, Madison's amendments were modified by the House, which con-
solidated into one amendment the rights to petition, assembly, press,
speech, and church.20 8 No documents explain why the framers of the
Constitution included the right to petition and assemble with the
other First Amendment rights rather than accepting Madison's dichot-
omous approach.0 9 On September 24, 1789, the First Amendment of
the Constitution was ratified in its present form.210 The final version
of the First Amendment does not indicate if the right to petition is
corollary to, or separate from other First Amendment guarantees.
This vagueness has created confusion in the interpretation of the right
to petition.
2. The Right of Access to the Courts is Encompassed Under the First
Amendment's Petition Clause
Only a handful of Supreme Court cases have addressed whether
the First Amendment supplies a substantive right of access to the
courts. 1' One of the few cases to address this issue is California Mo-
tor Transportation Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.2  In this case, the peti-
tioners and respondents were competing trucking companies
operating in California. 3 Trucking Unlimited brought suit against
205. The earliest case which predominantly relies on the First Amendment's right to
petition is NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). However, it was not until the 1980's
that most courts began to address this issue. See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir.
1990); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984);
Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).
206. Spanbauer, supra note 204, at 39.
207. Id. The First Amendment originally read "to guarantee the right to petition the
Legislature." Id at 43 n.96. While in committee, the House changed the provision to "the
right to petition Government." Id The modification expanded petition rights to apply to
all aspects of government, including the judicial branch. Id.
208. Id. at 40.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 42.
211. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72 (5th
Cir. 1983).
212. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
213. Id. at 509.
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California Motor Transportation, Inc., alleging that the carrier partici-
pated in anti-trust activities by filing legal suits to defeat applications
for trucking operating rights.214 The Supreme Court held that under
anti-trust laws, a valid cause of action was stated because use of the
judicial system is a fundamental right under the First Amendment's
Petition Clause.215 Any scheme or attempt to prevent litigants from
accessing judicial channels would, therefore, violate the First Amend-
ment's Petition Clause.216
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,2 17 a unanimous
Supreme Court reiterated that the First Amendment guarantees a
right of access to the judicial system. Specifically, the Court held that
well-founded but retaliatory lawsuits brought by employers against
employees may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice.21 8 Recog-
nizing the importance of the right to petition, the Court noted: "The
right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor
practice solely on the ground that what is sought in the court is to
enjoin employees from exercising a protected right. '219
In Ryland v. Shapiro,220 the Fifth Circuit provided a more elabo-
rate explanation of the right of access guaranteed by the Petition
Clause. In Shapiro, Lavonna Ryland was murdered by the defendant
Alfred Shapiro, a local prosecutor.221 Shapiro and another deputy
district attorney concealed Layonna's murder and prevented a full in-
vestigation by cancelling the autopsy and convincing the coroner to
list suicide as the cause of death.222 The prosecutors also pressured
the police to halt the investigation of Lavonna's murder. After
eleven months, the cover-up was exposed and Shapiro was convicted
of murder.2 4 Lavonna's parents brought suit under the Civil Rights
Act,22 alleging that the cover-up had denied them access to the courts
and prevented them from instituting a wrongful death claim. 6
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Rylands were entitled to a
214. Id.
215. Id. at 510-11. ("Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of Gov-
ernment. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
petition.").
216. Id. at 515.
217. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
218. Id. at 731.
219. Id. at 741 (citing Peddie Buildings, 203 NLRB 265, 272 (1973)).
220. 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 969.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
226. Ryland, 708 F.2d at 969-70.
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"substantive constitutional right of access to the courts." 27 Further,
the Fifth Circuit Court held that due process required "adequate, ef-
fective, and meaningful" access.' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to determine if the defendants'
actions wrongfully interfered with the plantiffs' rights to access to such
a degree that a constitutional violation had occurred. On remand, the
district court determined that no constitutional violation had been
committed by the prosecutors.P9
The above cases indicate that the United States Supreme Court,
while never ruling directly on the issue, would be willing to find a right
of court access embodied in the First Amendment's Petition Clause.3 0
In California Motor Transportation Co. and Bill Johnson's Restau-
rants, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment guar-
antees access to and use of the judicial system so long as suits are not
baseless. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit, in Ryland, held outright that
interference with a litigant's right to petition may constitute a First
Amendment violation.231 These cases, however, do not hold that all
suits between private litigants have an absolute right to be heard.
Rather, the right to access under the Petition Clause, as described in
California Motor Transportation Co. and Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc., guarantees only that private parties have the opportunity to re-
solve legitimate grievances through public channels. For example, liti-
gants asserting frivolous claims may be barred from presenting
grievances in a court of law 233  This is because only certain claims,
and not access per se, have been barred, even though the practical
effect of establishing restrictions on certain claims may be to preclude
a party from accessing the courts.
3. Court Access as a Form of Political Expression
The Supreme Court has also applied First Amendment petition
protection to civil actions involving "forms of political expression."
227. Id. at 973.
228. Id. at 972 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)).
229. Ryland v. Shapiro, 586 F. Supp. 1495 (W.D. La. 1984).
230. Even though the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled whether the Petition
Clause guarantees an absolute right of judicial access, the Ninth Circuit did address the
issue in Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case,
Judge O'Scannlain, writing for the majority, stated that "the right of access to the courts
has been described as 'one aspect of the right to petition' protected by the First Amend-
ment.... Notwithstanding the fundamental rights of access to the courts, the Bar Associa-
tion does not cite.., any decision recognizing a right to judicial determination of a civil
claim within a prescribed period of time as an element of such right." Id. at 706 (quoting
California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
231. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983).
232. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
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For example, in NAACP v. Button,-33 the Court held that the activities
of the NAACP, including solicitation of legal advice, are protected
under the First Amendment as a mode of political expression. 234 In
the Button case, Virginia enacted a statute that prohibited solicitation
of any legal advice.- 5 The NAACP claimed exemption from applica-
tion of the statute. 36 While the Court primarily relied on freedom of
expression and association to find that the NAACP was not subject to
regulation under the statute, the Court did postulate an important rule
regarding the Petition Clause and expressive activity. The Court
stated:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique
of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government,
federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro commu-
nity in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.
Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives
through the ballot frequently turn to the courts.... And under
the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for re-
dress of grievances. 37
Therefore, the Supreme Court discreetly widened the application of
the Petition Clause to cases involving expressive activity. Statutes that
limit the ability of certain groups to bring their grievances to court and
thereby "express" themselves violate the Petition Clause.
After the Button decision, the Supreme Court left unclear
whether the First Amendment protects only substantive access to the
courts for claims invoking political expression. The Button decision
rested on the overlap between the NAACP's litigation and expressive
activities: litigation is necessary for the NAACP to forward its political
ideas. Other groups, however, may not present such a similar link
between litigation and expression. Claims asserting a right of access
to the courts based on political expression will, in all likelihood, be
analyzed on an individualized basis. The Petition Clause will not be
used by the courts to guarantee substantive access where litigation
and expressive activity are only tangentially related. The nature of the
underlying "expressive" claim and the extent to which litigation forms
an essential part of a group's expressive activity will, therefore, deter-
mine whether access is guaranteed under the First Amendment.
233. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
234. IE at 428-29.
235. Id. at 415.
236. Id
237. I& at 429-30.
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4. Limitations on the Right to Petition
a. Excessive Court Delays and the Petition Clause
Although the Supreme Court has indicated (albeit in vague
terms) that the First Amendment probably supplies a substantive right
of access to the courts by private parties, it is unclear whether this
right requires mitigation by courts of lengthy trial delays. In the re-
cent landmark case of Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu,238 the
Ninth Circuit finally addressed the issue of whether excessive court
delays constitute a violation of the Petition Clause. In Eu, the Los
Angeles County Bar Association challenged the constitutionality of a
California statute which limited the number of judges that could sit on
the Los Angeles Superior Court.23 9 The statute authorized 224 judges
for Los Angeles' superior courts, plus another fourteen to be ap-
pointed at the option of the county.240 The Bar Association claimed
that the strict limitations on the number of judges caused excessive
delays and violated the First Amendment's Petition Clause.241 The
Bar Association also claimed that trial delays in Los Angeles County,
which far exceeded those of most other counties in California, de-
prived citizens of the equal protection of the laws.242
The Ninth Circuit court in Eu first recognized the severity of trial
delays in Los Angeles County, noting that "for civil jury trials held in
June 1988, the median time from filing to trial was fifty-nine months.
In 1989, only 50% of all civil cases in Los Angeles County were re-
solved in less than two years, 90% were resolved in 4.2 years, and 98%
in 6.3 years. 243 The court, however, acknowledged that significant
improvements in caseload management had improved trial
backlogs.244 After recognizing that the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment guarantees substantive access to the courts, the court fi-
nally addressed whether the trial delays denied litigants access to the
238. 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992). See also supra note 230.
239. Id. at 699-700.
240. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69586 (West 1994).
241. Eu, 979 F.2d at 699-700.
242. Id. at 699.
243. Id. at 700.
244. I1& These improvements in caseload management were largely attributable to the
Trial Delay Reduction Acts of 1988 and 1990. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68600-68620
(West 1994). The TCDRA, or "fast-track" systems, delegated primary responsibility for
case management to the judges, including setting time limits, enforcing deadlines, and re-
porting the ages of cases. JuDicrtL COUNCL OF CALIFoRNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT,
VOLUME 1: JUDICIAL COuNcIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGIsLATURE 12
(1992). While "fast-track" has improved caseload management, civil trial delays continue
to plague the system. For example, as of June 30, 1993, 49,510 cases were awaiting trial (or
fifty-three cases per judicial position). JuDIciAL COuNcu_ OF CALIFORNA, 1994 ANNtUAL
REPORT, supra note 12, at 109. Of this number, 41,451 were civil cases. Id. at 125.
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judicial system.1 5 The court concluded that the statute prescribing
the number of judges in Los Angeles County was constitutional.24 6
Specifically, the court found that there is "no basis in the Constitution
for a rigid right to resolution of all civil claims ...within a time
frame." 7 Judge O'Scannlain, writing for the majority, reasoned that
civil trials, unlike criminal proceedings, progress at varying rates de-
pending on discovery and settlement negotiations."AS These consider-
ations prevent the implementation of rigid time limits. Nevertheless,
the court specifically refused to rule on whether there is an "outer
[time] limit" for civil trial delays1 9 Confined to the facts of the case,
the court was forced to find that trial delays in Los Angeles County
did not amount to a constitutional violation:
The Bar Association has not provided any evidence that the av-
erage length of civil proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Court
leads to inaccurate decisions or ineffective relief, or even that
court delays have ever deprived any Los Angeles County litigant
of the ability to vindicate important rights. Furthermore, we are
unable to discern, on this record, how much the average delay
must be attributed to the state's administration of the judicial
system, and how much is properly laid at the feet of the litigants
themselves.... This record reveals nothing that would enable
this court to hold that the delays should be elevated to violations
with constitutional stature.25 °
Finally, the Ninth Circuit court in Eu dismissed the Bar Associa-
tion's equal protection argument, finding that California's judicial sys-
tem is "rationally designed."' 51 Specifically, the court found that
tolerating longer trial delays in certain geographic areas is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest because trial delays may be better
tolerated in urban areas than in rural locations. 2 2 In Eu, the court
rejected the application of heightened scrutiny because "[s]ection
69586 [the code section in dispute] does not classify persons on the
basis of any suspect characteristic and . . . the Supreme Court has
never recognized a fundamental right to judicial resolution of civil ac-
tions within a prescribed period of time." 3
245. Eu, 979 F.2d at 706.
246. Id.
247. Id
248. Id
249. Id at 706-07.
250. Id. at 707 (emphasis in original).
251. Id at 708.
252. Id.
253. Id at 707.
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b. The Relationship between the Petition Clause and Other First
Amendment Protections
Another factor that may prevent courts from finding a substan-
tive right to judicial access is the interpretation of the Petition Clause
adopted by three circuit courts.5 According to these courts' view,
there is only a substantive right to petition the government when
other First Amendment rights are also asserted. Therefore, the reli-
gion, speech, press, and assembly clauses of the First Amendment de-
fine the application of the petition clause. In Altman v. Hurst, 5 the
Seventh Circuit decided that a police officer who had filed a civil
rights suit against his employer could not assert a substantive right of
access to the judicial system. The court concluded that constitutional
protection under the Petition Clause only exists where the underlying
claim implicates other First Amendment rights. 56 Therefore, "a pri-
vate ofrce dispute cannot be constitutionalized merely by filing a legal
action. '257 Even though courts might be willing to recognize a right to
petition only where other First Amendment rights are implicated,
other constitutional guarantees may be invoked to protect judicial
access.
C. The Right to a Jury THal
The Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved."' 258 This United States constitutional right
to a jury trial, as well as the corollary right guaranteed under the Cali-
fornia Constitution,259 may provide another challenge to inadequate
court funding. The essence of the argument is that trial delays, due to
inadequate funding, infringe on the right to a jury trial at common
law. 6  This is especially true where courts have halted jury trials due
to a lack of funds to pay juror expenses.26 Seventh Amendment chal-
lenges to compel court funding have met with some success in both
254. These are the 5th, the 7th, and the 11th Circuits. See Spanbauer, supra note 204, at
4647.
255. 734 F.2d 1240 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Day v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768
F.2d 696,700-01 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick,
722 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
256. Altman, 734 F.2d at 1244 n.10.
257. Id.
258. U.S. CONSr. amend. VII.
259. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
260. Kenneth J. Chesebro & Ned Miltenberg, Justice Denied. Constitutional Challenges
to Court Delay, TRIAL, Apr. 1993, at 26-27.
261. In 1990, Vermont declared a six-month moratorium on jury trials in civil cases.
Charles Edward Anderson, Budget Trials; Lower Court Strikes Down V4 Cost-Cutting Jury
Moratorium, A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 23. In addition, courts in California, Alaska, North
Dakota, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have all temporarily halted jury trials for some
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federal and state courts. The Ninth Circuit first tackled this issue in
Armster v. United States.262
In Armster, the petitioners were plaintiffs in civil cases pending
before the Federal District Court of Alaska and the Central District
Court of California.2 3 In 1986, both of these courts suspended civil
jury trials due to a lack of funds to pay jury fees.264 These jury suspen-
sions were based on the recommendations of the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts and the Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference to suspend civil trials for three-and-one-half
months in 1986.265 The plaintiffs argued that the suspensions in-
fringed on their right to a jury trial.266 The Justice Department, how-
ever, contended that the Seventh Amendment does not require that
civil jury trials occur within a specified time frame and, therefore, the
suspensions were constitutionally valid.267
The Ninth Circuit accepted the petitioners' argument and held
that civil jury trial suspensions violated the Seventh Amendment.268
First, the court noted that the right to a jury trial in civil cases is "fun-
damental" and that limitations on this right must be scrutinized in the
"most rigorous manner. '269 Next, the Ninth Circuit court observed
that the civil jury system is not costly.2 70 For example, the cost of
funding the civil jury system in 1979 was roughly equal to "two jet
fighters,' 271 and the cost of funding criminal and civil juries in 1986
was "one-sixtieth... of building one new space shuttle."'  Finally,
the Ninth Circuit harshly condemned the civil jury suspensions as
unconstitutional:
[T]he availability of constitutional rights does not vary with the
rise and fall of account balances in the Treasury. Our basic lib-
erties cannot be offered and withdrawn as "budget crunches"
come and go.... [C]onstitutional rights do not turn on the polit-
ical mood of the moment, the outcome of cost/benefit analyses
or the results of economic or fiscal calculations. Rather, our
constitutional rights are fixed and immutable.... The constitu-
length of time. See Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986);
Odden v. O'Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990).
262. 792 F.2d 1423 (1986).
263. Id. at 1424.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1428.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1430.
269. Id. at 1428.
270. Id. at 1429.
271. Id. (citing In re United States Fim. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 430 & n.71 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, sub nom, Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980)).
272. Id.; see J.N. Wilford, Reagan Is Reported Near Decision to Approve a New Space
Shuttle, N.Y. TIMEs, May 25, 1986, at 1.
tional mandate that federal courts provide civil litigants with a
system of civil jury trials is clear. There is no price tag on the
continued existence of that system.
2 73
In 1989, civil jury trials were similarly suspended in North Dakota
by the Presiding Judge of the Northeast Judicial District.274 This two-
year blanket moratorium was implemented due to chronic court un-
derfunding.275 The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Odden v.
O'Keefe,276 using almost the exact language of Armster, found that the
blanket moratorium violated the Seventh Amendment.
277
Vermont, on the other hand, decided that suspensions of civil jury
trials may be constitutional. In late 1989, the governor of Vermont
ordered a two-percent reduction in judicial appropriations due to the
state's financial problems.278 Subsequently, the Vermont House of
Representatives cut the judicial budget by another $127,000.279 In re-
action to this fiscal crisis, 0 on January 11, 1990, the Vermont
Supreme Court promulgated Administrative Directive 17, ordering all
state courts to suspend civil jury trials.8 1 This Directive, however,
allowed administrative judges to hear civil jury trials "where justice
requires."'  Litigants from thirteen civil court cases brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the directive.283 In Administrative
Directive 17 v. Vermont Supreme Court, the court reached a different
conclusion than the North Dakota court and the Ninth Circuit regard-
ing whether moratoria delaying civil jury trials violate the Seventh
Amendment. After observing that trial delays are not per se unconsti-
tutional and that judges need the requisite authority to manage dock-
ets, the court distinguished Armster.284 First, the court interpreted
273. Armster, 792 F.2d at 1429.
274. Odden v. O'Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707, 707 (N.D. 1990). In addition to the morato-
rium on civil jury trials, the Presiding Judge asked for criminal jury expenses to be cut by
51%. It at 707 n.1.
275. Odden, 450 N.W.2d at 707.
276. 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990).
277. Id. at 709.
278. Vermont Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Supreme Court, 579
A.2d 1036 (Vt. 1990).
279. Id.
280. The Vermont court budget in 1990 was $13 million. Vermont Judiciary Suspends
Civil Jury Trial, UPI, Jan. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The
moratorium, however, was predicted to save only $70,000. Id. Vermont Supreme Court
Administrator, Thomas Lehner, further stated: "The Supreme Court does not intend by
this cut that the Legislature replace the money ... It simply is dealing with a necessity of
accommodating the deficit.... Any cuts at this time in the judiciary's budget are going to
affect services... . The Supreme Court's choice is between civil cases and criminal cases."
Id.
281. Admin. Directive No. 17, 579 A.2d at 1037.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1042-43.
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Armster to mean that the length of moratoria on civil jury trials is the
critical issue in determining Seventh Amendment violations."8 While
blanket moratoria necessarily violate the right to a jury trial because
the trials are indefinitely suspended, the Seventh Amendment is not
violated where directives only temporarily, and for a short time, sus-
pend jury trials. 86 The court next distinguished Armster by stating
that its opinion relied on Vermont constitutional provisions, not the
federal constitutional right to a jury trial.287
In Administrative Directive 17 the court mistakenly concluded
that the Directive is a mere suspension of civil jury trials rather than
an unconstitutional blanket moratorium. Even though the Directive
technically allowed civil jury trials to be held "where justice re-
quire[d]," the effect of the moratorium was to delay nearly all civil
jury cases. 88 Therefore, the moratorium was blanket in nature be-
cause it would apply to practically all civil trials. Furthermore, the
length of the moratoria in the two cases varied: the moratorium found
to be unconstitutional in Armster lasted only three-and-one-half
months.289 In comparison, the Vermont moratorium lasted a full six
months.290 In light of the longer length of the Vermont moratorium
and its broad application to almost all civil trials, the Vermont
Supreme Court's decision is illogical.
California's guarantee of a right to a jury trial is more extensive
than the corollary federal constitutional right, and perhaps will afford
more protection from court underfunding. The California Declara-
tion of Rights reads: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all." '91 While no California court has had opportunity to
apply this constitutional provision to compel court funding, the defer-
ence accorded this right has been restated in many cases. For exam-
ple, in People v. Walker,29 the court stated that the constitutional
guarantee to a jury trial "must be strictly followed. 29 3 Similarly, in
285. I& at 1042.
286. It at 1043.
287. Id These Vermont constitutional provisions are VT. CONST. chap. I, art. 12 and
VT. CONST. chap. II, § 38. Admin. Directive No. 17,579 A.2d at 1038-39. VT. CONST. chap.
I, art. 12 states: "When any issue in fact, proper for the cognizance of a jury is joined in a
court of law, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." VT.
CONST. chap. I, art. 4 states: "Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy,
by having recourse to the laws... he ought to obtain right and justice ... promptly and
without delay."
288. Admin. Directive No. 17, 579 A.2d at 1037.
289. Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986).
290. Admin. Directive No. 17, 579 A.2d at 1037.
291. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
292. 338 P.2d 536 (Cal. 1959).
293. Id. at 540.
Byram v. Superior Court,294 the court held that "the right to trial byjury is a basic and fundamental part of our system of jurisprudence.
As such, it should be zealously guarded by the courts. In case of
doubt, therefore, the issue should be resolved in favor of preserving a
litigant's right to trial by jury. '295 Furthermore, any act of the legisla-
ture which attempts to abridge the constitutional right to trial by jury
is void.2 96 However, the legislature may "establish reasonable regula-
tions or conditions on enjoyment of the right [to a trial by jury] as long
as the essential elements of trial by jury are preserved.' '29  These
statements indicate that California courts might be willing to find an
abridgment of the state constitutional right to a trial by jury where
court underfunding effectively prevents the trial of matters by jury.
D. The Due Process Clause
A fourth and final approach to challenge inadequate court fund-
ing is to assert the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This clause reads: "No state shall... deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law. '2 98 As discussed in the
first section of this Note, inadequate court funding creates trial delays
and perhaps even prevents parties from bringing suits altogether..2 99 If
causes of action are viewed as a type of property, then the Fourteenth
Amendment dictates that the government may not place restrictions
on court access.
In 1982, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,300 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff's cause of action is a prop-
ertied interest. The plaintiff, Laverne Logan, was hired by the defend-
ant as a shipping clerk. 0 1 One month later, Logan was allegedly
discharged because his short left leg hindered the performance of his
job duties.3" Logan filed timely charges against his employer with the303
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Under Illinois
law, the Commission was required to set up a fact finding conference
within 120 days from the date the charges were filed.304 The Commis-
sion, however, mistakenly scheduled the conference after the 120 day
294. 74 Cal. App. 3d 648 (1977).
295. Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
296. See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1951).
297. People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742,745 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1077 (1977).
298. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
299. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
300. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
301. Id. at 426.
302. Id.
303. Id,
304. Id. at 424-25.
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period had expired, thereby destroying the plaintiff's claim.3 °0
The Supreme Court ruled that Logan's causes of action were pro-
tected under the Due Process Clause and that he was entitled to have
his claim fairly adjudged. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
applied the two-part Mullane test30 6 to determine if Logan's claims
were deserving of Fourteenth Amendment protection. In Mullane,
the Supreme Court limited trial courts' authority to dismiss cases
without an opportunity for a hearing on the merits.3 0 7 The Mullane
test essentially asks if the plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest
and if so, what process is due.308
First, the Court in Logan announced that "a cause of action is a
species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause."309 Justice Blackmun supported this contention by ar-
guing that prior Supreme Court decisions had held that the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process guarantee creates a personal right to a fair
hearing.310 Justice Blackmun also argued that case law had estab-
lished that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause could be
used to prevent states from denying litigants access to the courts.3 1'
Next, the Court approached the question of what specific inter-
ests had been violated. Justice Blackmun stated that the interest im-
plicated in the case was that "the State may not finally destroy a
property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportu-
nity to present his claim of entitlement."3 12 The Court's determina-
tions were reached by employing the Mathews v. Eldridge31 balancing
test. This balancing test weighs three factors: 1) the private interest
affected by the official action; 2) the risk of deprivation of due process
rights through the procedures used; and 3) the government's interests
involved.1 4 In Logan, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's individ-
ual interests in having his claims adjudicated outweighed the financial
burdens that would otherwise be imposed on the state.31 5
305. Id at 426.
306. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane, a New
York law was challenged that provided for common trust fund accounts to be settled by
fiduciaries through notice published in newspapers. Id. at 306. The Court concluded that
the statute did not give adequate notice and, therefore, deprived the beneficiaries of their
rightful property without proper notice and hearing. Id at 320.
307. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
308. Logan, 455 U.S. at 428.
309. Id
310. Id at 429.
311. Id.
312. Id at 434.
313. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
314. Id at 335.
315. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434-35.
Under the Mullane standard, due process challenges to inade-
quate court funding in California will only be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis. Employing the Mullane methodology, the California
courts will find that only where inadequate funding threatens to de-
stroy a plaintiff's cause of action completely will the claim be viewed
as a property interest worthy of Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion.316 Small trial delays, on the other hand, do not implicate the
Due Process Clause. If a cause of action passes this first step of the
Mullane test, then the Mathews v. Eldridge factors are balanced to
determine if due process was violated. One federal trial judge ob-
served that "[g]iven federal budget constraints, the probability of a
due process challenge surviving a balancing test will depend upon a
showing of relatively extensive delays and a resultant deprivation of
justice that is considerably pervasive. 317
A higher standard of review may be employed to assess due pro-
cess concerns by arguing that the right of access to justice is funda-
mental. This approach is based on the seminal case of Boddie v.
Connecticut.318
In Boddie, a class of female welfare recipients seeking divorces
brought suit challenging court access fees.3 19 The women were unable
to obtain divorces due to the mandatory filing fees which cost, on av-
erage, $60.00 for a divorce.32 ° The Supreme Court, in a majority opin-
ion written by Justice Harlan, concluded that the mandatory access
fees violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.321 The access fees were deemed unconstitutional because they
denied the female welfare recipients "an opportunity to be heard
upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages. ' '3 2 By
this, however, the Court did not state that access fees were per se
unconstitutional. Rather, only where the litigants' rights are "of basic
importance in our society, '3 2 3 and where no "countervailing" state in-
terests justify the denial of due process, 324 do court access fees consti-
tute a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Therefore, Fourteenth
Amendment challenges will be most successful where court un-
316. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. The Mullane standard, that views a lawsuit as a
property interest, is only available for civil actions. Criminal actions would be analyzed
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
317. David Hittner & Kathleen Weisz Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A Constitu-
tional Dilemma?, 31 S. TEx. L. REv. 341, 354 (1990).
318. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
319. Id, at 372.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 380-81.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 376.
324. Id at 377.
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derfunding hinders resolution or determination of "fundamental
rights," such as marriage.
In fact, Justice Harlan struggled to distinguish the facts of Boddie
from other access fee challenges. In particular, Harlan emphasized
the importance of the specific right that the plaintiffs attempted to
assert-namely, the right to dissolve marriages. After explicitly con-
ceding that Boddie was decided solely on the merits of the case, how-
ever, Harlan enunciated the most puzzling statement of the opinion:
"[W]e hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without af-
fording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing
SO. "325
Lower court cases have split on the interpretation of this state-
ment. Some jurisdictions have read the opinion to indicate that access
to justice itself is a fundamental right.32 6 According to this theory, the
exercise of a right (in this case, the dissolution of marriage) becomes
especially vital where states have provided a cause of action for in-
fringement of the right "without affording all citizens access" to exer-
cise the right.32 7
On the other hand, other courts have limited Boddie to cases in
which access to courts is required to assert a fundamental interest
(such as the dissolution of marriage) and where judicial rule is the
only means available to effectuate that interest.328 Most courts have
applied this interpretation to strike down access fees only where "fun-
damental interests" are implicated. Access to the courts, however, is
not a "fundamental interest." Therefore, analysis of the rights which
litigants attempt to assert under the "fundamental standard" deter-
mine whether access fees violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
California has adopted the approach that access to the courts is a
fundamental right. In Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, the Ninth
Circuit court reasoned that, while there is no constitutional right to
have civil claims disposed of within a certain time frame, access to the
courts is a "fundamental right[ ].",329 Specifically, the Eu court found
that the "fundamental" nature of the right is based on the Privileges
325. Id- at 383.
326. See Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe interest at stake
(the right to appeal a civil damage suit) is not as fundamental as, for example, marriage or
liberty (in the sense of freedom from imprisonment)" (emphasis added)); Eichenseer v.
Reserve Life Insur. Co., 881 F.2d 1355, n.6 (5th Cir. 1989); Allen v. Greyhound, 656 F.2d
418, 422 (9th Cir. 1981); Fisher v. City of Cincinnati, 753 F. Supp. 681, 685 n.4 (D. Ohio
1990).
327. Id at 383.
328. See supra text accompanying note 253.
329. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1992).
and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment's Petition Clause, as
well as the Due Process Clause." Civil trial delays, according to the
Eu court, might also constitute due process violations where delays
"deprive individual litigants of the ability to vindicate fundamental
rights. ' 331 Therefore, state legislative restrictions hindering access to
the courts will be deemed per se unconstitutional. Restrictions that
only produce trial delays, however, are not unconstitutional unless
they prevent a litigant from vindicating fundamental rights.332
Even Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe observed that barri-
ers to access might be found unconstitutional on a federal level:
What emerges from these [referring to Boddie] disparate cases
and lines of thought is, quite clearly, less than a solidly grounded
or coherently elaborated right of judicial access. But it would be
surprising, and ultimately indefensible, if the separate strands of
doctrine... were not in the end woven into a fundamental right
of access to a neutral and fair tribunal ... to ventilate such
claims of right as one may have under the governing body of
substantive law.333
IV. Proposals
As noted in Part I, the California trial courts are confronted with
shrinking resources while the number and complexity of cases con-
tinue to increase. In order to better cope with these problems, Cali-
fornia should develop a comprehensive plan to adequately fund the
courts, protect the independence of the judiciary, and provide quality
justice during times of economic hardship. This proposal contains
three elements: (1) the establishment of a Commission on the Judici-
ary to set trial court funding levels; (2) the enforcement of adequate
funding through suits at law; and (3) structural improvements in court
management.
A. The Commission on the Judiciary
The first element is the establishment of a commission to set and
appropriate trial court budgets. Furthermore, the state should assume
responsibility for 100% of state trial court funding needs. Under the
330. Id. at 705-06.
331. I& at 707. The Eu court also refused to strike down California's five-year
mandatory dismissal statute as violative of due process. Id. (citing CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE
§ 583.360 (West 1994)). According to the court, the petitioners failed to show "any in-
stance in which court congestion caused [sic] delays leading to dismissal under this statute,
effectively preventing vindication of fundamental rights." Eu, 979 F.2d at 707.
332. Id
333. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 759 (2d ed. 1988). See
also Kenneth 3. Chesebro & Ned Miltenberg, supra note 260, at 27.
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Trial Court Realignment and Efficiency Act of 1991,11 the state gov-
ernment has agreed to provide only up to 70% of state trial court
funding. This means that the counties must make up the difference.
Unfortunately, the counties have few resources and cannot levy sales
or other taxes to provide the remaining sums needed to fund the trial
courts. By providing complete funding, however, the state and its
agencies will have the means and ability to adequately fund the courts
by drawing on state revenues.
Shifting funding responsibility solely to the state, however, cre-
ates the potential for the judiciary to become enmeshed in legislative
budgetary quarrels. For example, in 1991, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held legislative term limits to be constitutional. 335 The legisla-
ture, obviously displeased with this result, retaliated against the court
by decreasing their funding by 38%: "[L]egislators didn't just get mad
[with the term limits decision in Eu]. They got even. Four months
later, the first Assembly committee to review the high Court's budget
chopped 38 percent off the top-precisely the same reduction im-
posed on the Legislature by Proposition 140. The subcommittee's ac-
tion ...was the opening day in a season of revenge against the
Supreme Court. ' 336
Presently, the Trial Court Budget Commission (TCBC) oversees
the compilation and presentment of the judicial budget to the legisla-
ture.337 This commission, however, does little more than review indi-
vidual requests by the trial courts and assemble them into a single
state-wide judicial budget.33 s In order to ensure an independent judi-
ciary, free from political blackmail, this commission should be empow-
ered to separately review and submit the state court judicial budget
for gubernatorial approval. Moreover, this commission should consist
of equal representatives from the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive branches. The TCBC should have sole authority to decide
trial court budgets, by-passing legislative decisionmaking and submit-
ting its budget directly to the governor for approval with the state-
wide budget. In this sense, the commission will act as a legislative
committee, but its recommendations will not need the full approval of
the state Senate and Assembly.
334. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 77200 (West 1993).
335. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292
(1992).
336. Bill Ainsworth, Battle of the Branches-The Supreme Court vs. the Legislature,
CALiFoR~iA JouRNiA., Jan. 1, 1993, at 21-22. The Legislature also retaliated by introduc-
ing a Senate amendment to prevent the judiciary from "undo[ing] budget cuts." Id. Even-
tually, Governor Pete Wilson convinced the legislature to cut the court's budget by only 10
percent. Id. See also J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the Independence of the Judiciary, 66 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 2209, 2215 (1993).
337. JUDICIAL CouNciL OF CALFORNIA, 1994 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
338. Id.
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The TCBC should be bound by the mandate to provide sufficient
funding in order to maintain "quality justice." The term "quality jus-
tice" should be interpreted to prevent underfunding in the courts.
However, provision should also be made for decreases in funding in
the event of emergency situations. In deciding courts' budgets, the
Commission should take into account the number of case filings, the
complexity of the cases, and opportunities for alternative dispute reso-
lution. Furthermore, the TCBC should be subject to a strict time limit
to present its budget to the governor.
B. Suits at Law to Procure Necessary Funding
A second element of the proposal is to bring mandamus writs to
compel adequate financing to the courts based on the constitutional
arguments discussed in this Note. Such writs should argue the appli-
cability of the Inherent Powers Doctrine, stressing the need for the
California courts to adopt a broad interpretation of the doctrine so
that court expenses may be compelled without the threat of imposi-
tion of statutory limitations. This view best adheres to our system of
checks and balances by ensuring an independent judiciary, free from
legislative controls. This check against the legislature is particularly
important as the legislature can easily subdue, coerce, or punish the
judiciary through funding mechanisms.
Federal and state guarantees of the right to petition may also be
argued where funding cutbacks deny potential litigants access to the
courts. Where suits are well-founded in law and fact, litigants should
be able to rely on the First Amendment to ensure access to federal
and state court systems. Furthermore, if a litigant's expressive activity
is hampered through an inability to access judicial channels, courts
may even be more willing to find that a constitutional violation has
occurred. Finally, limitations imposed on the Petition Clause should
be reconsidered and overturned by the Supreme Court. The Eu opin-
ion, which held that excessive trial delays do not violate the Petition
Clause,339 is inadequate because excessive time delays create strong
barriers to litigation. When faced with inordinate trial delays, many
litigants will simply refuse to file suit. The Supreme Court should cor-
rect this problem by applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to
cases where the Petition Clause is invoked to challenge time delays.
In addition, the Seventh Amendment's (and the California Con-
stitution's)' 4 protection of jury trials should be interpreted to prohibit
any moratoria on jury trials. Moratoria that allow jury trials under
exceptional circumstances or where "justice so requires" nonetheless
violate the Seventh Amendment. It will be extremely difficult for liti-
339. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1992).
340. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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gants to prove that their case merits a trial by jury under the excep-
tions. In addition, the blanket/temporary moratoria distinction in
Administrative Directive 1731 should be abandoned because it is im-
possible to forecast how long a moratorium on jury trials might last.
For example, the moratorium found unconstitutional in Armster42
lasted two and a half months while the constitutional moratorium in
Administrative Directive 17 lasted six months.' 3
Lastly, challenges to inadequate funding should rely on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in arguing that the
right to justice is fundamental and should be accorded heightened
scrutiny. The Mullane344 test, which equates lawsuits as property in-
terests, neglects the symbolic and functional importance that our judi-
cial system serves for every citizen. Justice, whether it be civil or
criminal, is not simply a private property interest, but a public interest
and code of action that dictates societal behavior. In this sense, justice
should be viewed as a fundamental right and accorded strict scrutiny
where court delays undermine its imposition.
C. Internal Structural Reforms
The first two elements of this proposal attempt to reform external
factors that affect the functioning of the courts-namely, the budget
process and funding levels. The proposal, however, is not complete
without addressing needs for internal reform. Recently, many ideas
have been presented to internally reform the judicial branch. These
include: court automation, case management, trial court consolidation,
and the use of alternative dispute resolution.345
1. Court Automation
Within the past decade many judicial processes have been auto-
mated in California. Such automation has included video arraign-
ments, fax filings, electronic audio recordings, and document imaging.
Courts in Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, and San Diego coun-
ties have experimented with using video arraignments. 46 The use of
video arraignments eliminates the need to transport prisoners for ar-
341. See supra text accompanying notes 278-287.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 262-273.
343. Vermont Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Supreme Court, 579
A.2d 1036, 1036 (Vt. 1990).
344. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also supra text
accompanying notes 306-311.
345. See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of
Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2049 (1993).
346. Ready for Prime Time?, L.A. Trams, Sept. 30, 1993, at B6 (home edition); Mark
Pinsky, Jury Out on High-Tech Courtroom, L.A. Tnmms, Dec. 17, 1993, at Al (home
edition).
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raignments, thereby reducing the prison costs.347 Los Angeles County
Deputy District Attorney Norman Shapiro described the benefits of
televising arraignments:
With video arraignments, a defendant is booked in the down-
town Parker Center jail [in Los Angeles], then goes to a sound-
proof booth in the jail cafeteria with a defense attorney and
appears before the judge on T.V. There is no need to transport
the accused to the Criminal Courts Building, a saving of time
and security problems.... The judge communicates with the
defendant through a speaker. An electronic camera installed in
the T.V. set projects his [or her] image to the courtroom. The
prosecutor, who is at the courthouse, also is visible to the de-
fendant. A videotape of the proceedings shows a three-way split
screen with all participants visible.'
In addition to the use of video arraignments in county jails, such ar-
raignments were recently introduced in the state prison system. 4 9 On
August 29, 1994, an inmate from Pelican Bay State Prison was ar-
raigned via video.35
Document filing via facsimile has also been introduced to the
California trial court system.351 In 1992, the Judicial Council propa-
gated rules requiring all trial courts to accept filings by facsimile if the
document met all necessary requirements except an original signa-
ture.352 Facsimile filing not only facilitates document filing for attor-
neys, but also reduces staff needs in clerk offices.
Another development in court automation is the use of electronic
recording devices to replace court reporters.353 According to studies
undertaken by the Judicial Council, audio recordings save approxi-
mately $28,000 per year in each courtroom while video recordings
save roughly $41,000 per year in each courtroom.35 4 Finally, the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts3 55 has introduced document imaging
technology to the trial courts. 6 Document imaging technology
utilizes incorporates documentary evidence into the trial record.357
347. Linda Deutsch, L.A. Court Uses TV to Streamline Arraignment Process, FRESNO
BEE, Jan. 27, 1991, at B4.
348. Id.
349. Prison Inmate Arraigned by Video, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 29, 1994, at A14.
350. Id.
351. JUDICIAL. COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 29.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 27.
354. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALFORNIA, 1992 ANUAL REPORT, supra note 244, at 20.
355. The Administrative Office of the Courts was established as a department of the
Judicial Council and "carries out the official actions of the Judicial Council... under the
supervision of the Administrative Director of the Courts." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALI-
FORNrA, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 212.
356. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 28.
357. Id. at 28.
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In addition to the implementation of such court automation pro-
cedures, the legislature has attempted to encourage the use of court
automation. For example, the Trial Court Realignment and Efficiency
Act requires that two percent of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures
collected in criminal cases be placed in a court automation fund.3 58
2. Case Management
Perhaps the most important development in increasing judicial
efficiency has been the introduction of case management programs.
In California, such case management programs have typically focused
on reducing trial delays. 9 The Trial Court Delay Reduction Acts
(TCDRA) of 1986 and 1990 allocated primary case management re-
sponsibility to the individual trial judges to manage their own trial
calendars.360 Furthermore, the TCDRA, or "fast-track" system en-
couraged judges to meet self-imposed deadlines by encouraging
judges to approximate how much time each trial would last before the
trial commenced.36' In addition, the 1990 Trial Delay Reduction Act
established a differential case management program from civil cases-
a "system that assigns cases to disposition time goals based on the
relative complexity of the case. '362 Today in California, all trial courts
have adopted "fast track" systems to improve case management.363
3. Trial Court Consolidation
Another reform measure that has been proposed in California is
to merge the municipal and superior courts into one trial court. Boalt
Hall professor Harry Scheiber indicates that trial court unification has
been endorsed as a measure of judicial reform since the 1940s.11 In
fact, he quotes a statement made by Dean Roscoe Pound in 1940:
"Unification of the courts [of original or limited jurisdiction] would go
far to enable the judiciary to do adequately much which in despera-
tion or efficient legal disposition by fettered courts, tied to cumber-
some and technical procedure, we have been committing more and
more to administrative boards and commissions. 3 65
Interestingly, court consolidation has once again been proposed
as a way to increase judicial efficiency. One recently considered mea-
358. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68090.9 (West 1995).
359. See JuDicmi CouNcL, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 244, at 12.
360. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6807 (West 1995); JUDICIAL CoUNcIL, 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 244, at 12.
361. JUDIc4AL CouNciL, 1992 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 244, at 12.
362. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68603 (West 1995).
363. JUDICLL COuNCIL, 1993 AmAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 11.
364. Scheiber, supra note 345, at 2076.
365. ld (quoting Roscoe Pound, Law in Book and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12
(1910)).
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sure proposed merging the municipal and superior courts. The Uni-
form Court Proposal Act, known as "SCA-3" (state constitutional
amendment) sought to "eliminate the provisions for superior, munici-
pal, and justice courts, and instead provide for district courts, their
establishment, and jurisdiction, and the qualification and election of
judges thereof. ' 36 6 The impetus behind SCA-3 was to streamline the
administration of justice by creating one layer of trial courts that could
better assign, coordinate, and monitor cases. 367 Under SCA-3, "all
trial court judges would be allowed to hear the entire range of cases,
from traffic tickets to death penalty to antitrust cases. '361 SCA-3 was
estimated to save approximately $200 million.369
SCA-3, however, was criticized for its virtual elimination of court
specialization. For example, many superior court judges argued that
municipal court judges were not prepared to handle many of the cases
currently residing in superior court dockets.370 Furthermore, officials
from the governor's office argued that the measure would actually in-
crease costs by $8.5 million because municipal court judges' salaries
would be raised to match superior court salaries.371
Ultimately, the arguments of the Wilson administration and the
superior court judges prevailed and SCA-3 did not receive sufficient
votes in the state assembly to become a ballot initiative.37 - The Judi-
cial Council, however, recently adopted rules similar to those in SCA-
3.373 Such rules require the courts to "'maximize the efficient use of
all judicial resources' by training and cross-assigning judges" from mu-
nicipal and superior courts. 4
4. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The final element of internal reform is the careful removal of cer-
tain actions to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) forums. Tradi-
tionally, ADR consists of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. 375
Each type of ADR may be conducted under the auspices of court su-
pervision or by private organizations. Furthermore, ADR may be
either binding or nonbinding. Where the court supervises ADR, trial
366. Cal. S.B. 379, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993).
367. Bill Ainsworth, Bill to Consolidate Trial Courts Falls Victim to Partisan Politics,
Thn RECORDER, Sept. 1, 1994, at 1.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Bill Kisliuk, Never the 7wain Shall Meet?, THE RECORDER, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1.
373. Bill Kisliuk, Court Consolidation Moving Forward Without Legislature, THE RE-
CORDER, Feb. 14, 1995, at 2.
374. Id.
375. Krislov & Kramer, supra note 20, at 1940.
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expenses and judicial resources are saved because a judge need only
ensure that negotiations between the parties are fair. Private ADR,
so long as it is binding, completely removes certain disputes from the
judicial system and therefore results in an even larger conservation of
judicial resources.
In the 20/20 Vision Report, Samuel Krislov and Paul Kramer ar-
gue that California's justice process should adopt the multidoor court-
house approach. 7 6 The authors analogize this system to "triage" in
the medical profession where "the most serious injuries are treated
first, and those persons who are not in immediate danger can be given
preliminary treatment that allows them to wait until a physician is
available to treat them further."377 An important aspect of the mul-
tidoor courthouse approach is that cases are directed to alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) services where feasible. Krislov and
Kramer argue that certain types of cases that take up much court re-
sources, such as business litigation, should automatically be removed
to ADR. 78
V. Conclusion
The extent of discussion and innovation of trial management
techniques demonstrates that California is seeking viable solutions to
real problems. Obviously, there are many possible ways to streamline
the judicial process. With this in mind, measures adopted must be
weighed for their cumulative effect on the quality, as well as the ad-
ministration of justice.
Clearly, present economic, demographic, and social pressures put
unprecedented strain on California's judicial system. Solutions
adopted will define the role California's courts will play throughout
the next century. Legislators, court administrators, judges, and even
attorneys must work together to develop goals and standards that
guide the courts in the future:
376. Id. at 1938. In fact, the Commission on the Future of the California Courts en-
dorsed the multidoor courthouse concept in their 2020 Vision Report. JusTIcE IN THE
BALANcE; 2020, supra note 1, at 41.
377. Krislov & Kramer, supra note 20, at 1938.
378. Id at 1941.
379. Juscm rN THE BAL.ANCE; 2020, supra note 1, at 7 (quoting Commission Chairman,
Dr. Robert R. Dockson, Address to the Symposium on the Future of the Courts, Dec.
1992).
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Alternative futures planning is not about predicting the future
but about postulating a plausible range of futures, to help us
select that which we hope to see. Remember Ebenezer Scrooge.
When the Ghost of Christmas Past shows him a scenario of a
possible future based on trends in Scrooge's life, Scrooge asks,
"Are these things that must be, or only things that may be?"
The answer for Scrooge and for us is that we may create and
choose the vision of the future that we prefer, and then seek to
make it real.379
INADEQUATE TRIAL COURT FUNDING

